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Abstract.  
Sharing Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) is a key strategy for improving cyber 
defense, but there are risks of breaching regulations and laws regarding privacy. 
With regulations such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that 
are designed to protect citizens’ data privacy, the managers of CTI datasets need 
clear guidance on how and when it is legal to share such information. This paper 
defines the impact that GDPR legal aspects may have on the sharing of CTI. In 
addition, we define adequate protection levels for sharing CTI to ensure compli-
ance with the GDPR. We also present a model for evaluating the legal require-
ments for supporting decision making when sharing CTI, which also includes 
advice on the required protection level. Finally, we evaluate our model using use 
cases of sharing CTI datasets between entities. 
 
Keywords: Cyber Threat Intelligence, Information Sharing, General Data Pro-
tection Regulation GDPR, Legal evaluation.  
1 Introduction 
Sharing Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) between organizations is a good strategy 
for building better cyber defence [1]. It assists organizations in understanding existing 
cyber attacks, and helps them to react against those attacks efficiently and quickly. 
However, CTI potentially contains sensitive and identifying information, such as IP 
addresses, email addresses and existing vulnerabilities [2]. Therefore, we should estab-
lish proper safeguards before sharing CTI datasets with others. When sharing CTI da-
tasets, organizations must ensure conformance with legal and regulatory requirements, 
such as those required by the state and federal level in the US [3], the Japanese Personal 
Information Protection Act (PIPA) [4], and the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) [5]. In the specific context of organizations being part of critical national in-
frastructure, the EU NIS Directive [6] mandates some level of CTI sharing. It requires 
all EU member states to establish national Computer Security Incident Response Teams 
(CSIRT), as a single point of contact, to report cyber incidents that affect critical infra-
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structure and essential services. This is supported by the European Network and Infor-
mation Security Agency (ENISA), which improves CSIRT capabilities by providing 
tools and methodologies to support network and information security [7]. 
In this paper, we investigate the legal aspects for sharing CTI datasets in the context 
of the GDPR [2] which is the principle law in the EU for regulating the processing of 
personal data in the EU. Personal data is defined as “any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’). An identifiable natural person 
is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an iden-
tifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to 
one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity of that natural person” (Art. 4(1), GDPR). 
In this paper, we will present an approach for defining the required protection level 
on CTI datasets, if they contain personal data, as defined by the GDPR. Based on the 
GDPR rules, this approach would help to make the decision of sharing and processing 
personal information clear. Moreover, it helps to provide some practical and clear rules 
to build data sharing agreements between organizations, because during the evaluation 
phase, we establish the purpose of the sharing, the legal basis and security measures for 
compliance with the law. This paper has two main contributions. First, to provide a 
decision process about sharing CTI datasets containing personal data in the context of 
the GDPR. Second, to convert existing legal grounds into rules that help organizations 
share such data whilst being legally compliant with the GDPR. These rules establish an 
association between the CTI policy space and the defined protection levels. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the steps of 
the methodology to build the approach. Section 3 gives several use cases of sharing CTI 
datasets to validate our approach. Section 4 discusses related work and finally section 
5 presents the conclusion and future research directions.  
2 Methodology 
This section presents the methodology we used to build an approach to evaluate the 
possibility of sharing personal data in the context of CTI datasets under the GDPR. The 
methodology consists of three main steps and is inspired by the DataTags project [8]. 
The first step is to define the possible levels of security requirements which agree with 
the principles considered by the GDPR when processing personal data in CTI datasets. 
The second step is to identify a policy space, i.e. a set of concepts, definitions, assertions 
and rules around the GDPR to describe the possible requirements for sharing CTI da-
tasets. The last step is to build the decision graph, which defines the sequence of ques-
tions that should be traversed to establish and assess the legal requirements for CTI data 
sharing, represented with an outcome as so-called “tags”. The DataTags project, devel-
oped by Latanya Sweeney’s group at Harvard University, helps researchers and insti-
tutions to share their data with guarantees that releases of the data comply with the 
associated policy, including American health and educational legislation [9]. It consists 
of labelling a dataset with a specific tag based on a series of questions. Each question 
is created based on a set of assertions under the applicable policy.  
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2.1 Defining DataTags related to cybersecurity information sharing 
The first step to achieving our goal is to define the tags that will be the possible 
decisions reached after a series of questions that interrogate CTI datasets for GDPR 
requirements. The legal requirements of the GDPR indicate in the first instance whether 
we can share or not. However, when the answer is positive, additional obligations for 
such sharing arise out of the principles and articles of the GDPR, in particular: the prin-
ciple of data minimization; the requirement that personal data must be processed se-
curely; and that the data must not be retained when no longer relevant. Hence, the de-
cision process also leads to conclusions on how sharing can take place by translating 
these constraints into technical requirements. All of this is represented in the “data tags” 
of the leaves of our decision graph. The organizations that are sharing CTI datasets 
should ensure that the receiving organization understands the sensitivity of this infor-
mation and receives clear instructions on what they are allowed to do with the infor-
mation, e.g. potential on-sharing. We will follow the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) [10] 
levels as a springboard, and expand them by adding security measures for each level in 
order to address the GDPR requirements of processing personal data when sharing CTI 
datasets. TLP was created to facilitate the sharing of information by tagging the infor-
mation with a specific color. TLP has four colors, indicating different levels of accepta-
ble distribution of data, namely [10]:  • WHITE - Unlimited. • GREEN - Community Wide. • AMBER - Limited Distribution. • RED - Personal for Named Recipients Only. 
This protocol records whether recipients may share this information with others. We 
have extended this protocol by adding appropriate security measures that are required 
for the legality of CTI sharing. To increase the trustworthiness between the entities and 
encourage entities to share CTI, we require the receiving organization to apply these 
security measures whilst keeping in mind that, in general, organizations use different 
approaches and levels of security practices. However, enforcing the receiver to apply 
these security measure is a challenge in itself and is beyond the scope of this paper.  
Table 1 shows the levels that we are going to use in order to label the shared datasets. 
Cells in columns “Tag type”, “Description”, and “Examples” are taken from the TLP 
description [11]. The values in columns “Security Measures” and “Transfer/Storage” 
are our proposals to meet the legislative requirements for securely sharing this data. We 
have proposed technical methods that would help organizations to achieve what the 
GDPR mandates as a technical requirements to ensure confidentiality and protect data 
subjects (Article 32). When proposing the security measures, we had to take into con-
sideration with whom we are going to share CTI datasets and their trustworthiness be-
cause recipients who cannot be relied upon to protect the shared information need to be 
eliminated from further sharing. 
We combine the notion of privacy preservation of the data with the trust level of the 
recipient organization, and because of that, we recommend the use of the Attribute-
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based Encryption (ABE) technique [12] [13]. For encryption, ABE can use any combi-
nation of a set of attributes as a public encryption key. Decryption privileges of the data 
in this type of encryption are not restricted to a particular identity but to entities with a 
set of attributes which may represent items such as business type and location. For ex-
ample, an organization chooses to grant access to an encrypted log of its internet traffic, 
but restricts this to a specific range of IP addresses. Traditional encryption techniques 
would automatically disclose the log file in case the secret decryption key is released. 
Table 1 lists example values of some attributes in the data. The first attribute is the 
location of the organization. Due to the different legal systems associated with interna-
tional transfer information exchange, we will consider three levels: National, EU and 
International. The second attribute is the sector of the organization, because of the sim-
ilarity of the working processes and procedures and likely similar threat models. The 
value might contain energy, health, education, finance and so on. Finally, the size of 
the organization may be relevant because the number of employees has been empiri-
cally related to the number of threats [14]. To use ABE, before sharing the data with 
other organizations and in case it is not shared to the public, the Setup Key Authority 
generates a master secret key along with a public key. It publishes the public key so 
everyone has access to it. The key authority uses the master secret key to generate a 
specific secret key for the participating organization in the sharing community. For ex-
ample, there might be an organization called “Alpha” which gets a specific secret key 
from the key generator authority. “Alpha” is an organization operating at the national 
level in the telecom sector. Before sharing any dataset with “Alpha”, the user will en-
crypt the dataset that has its own specific access policy. Hence, this user encrypts the 
dataset such that anyone at the national level working with the telecom business will be 
able to decrypt it. The organization sharing CTI datasets generates ciphertext with this 
policy. As a result, the organization “Alpha” will be able to decrypt the dataset. 
Table 1. ABE attribute 
Attribute  Value 
Location  National, EU, Global  
Organization Sector / Similarity of 
Business  
Central Authority, similar business, connected 
groups, … 
Organization Size Small, Medium, Big 
 
At all levels, Green, Amber and Red, data will be encrypted using the ABE method. 
In addition, we need to consider the data minimisation principle as defined in GDPR 
Art. 5(1)(c) “1. Personal data shall be: (c) adequate, relevant and limited to what is 
necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed (data minimisation)”. 
Hence, sharing should be designed to provide only the required data to successfully 
achieve a specific goal. This implies that we should use the minimum amount of iden-
tifiable information to decrease any privacy risk on individuals whose personal data 
might be included. Doing so will reduce the risks of the following potential privacy 
attacks on the data: 
Identity disclosure [15] [16]: this threat occurs when the attacker is able to connect 
a data subject with their record in a CTI dataset. For example, an attacker might identify 
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a victim because the dataset contains direct identifying information such as an email 
address, IP address or credential information. 
Membership disclosure [17]: this threat occurs when an attacker can derive that a 
specific data subject exists in the dataset. For example, the dataset contains information 
about specific malware victims. Any person established to be in the dataset reveals that 
this victim has been hacked by this malware. 
Attribute disclosure [18]: This threat occurs when data subjects are linked with 
information about their sensitive attributes such as biometric data that is used to 
uniquely identify an individual. Some personal information is more sensitive and de-
fined as a special category under the GDPR. The GDPR (Art. 9) defines special cate-
gories that need extra protection and prohibits processing this type of data unless certain 
conditions are applied. 
There are methods to remove personal information from an individual’s record in a 
way that decreases the possibility of all these attacks. Some of these methods that we 
can use are ݇-anonymity [15] which uses suppression and generalization as the main 
techniques, ݈-diversity [19] [18] which is an extension of k-anonymity to protect the 
shared data against background knowledge and Homogeneity Attacks, and �-closeness 
[20] which is another extension of ݈-diversity that decreases the granularity and makes 
the distribution of the sensitive attribute close to the distribution of the entire attribute. 
Table 2. Proposed DataTags relating to four proposed classes of access 
Type Description Examples Security Measures  Transfer 
/ Storage 
WHITE Information does not con-
tain any personal data or 
sensitive information so it 
can be shared publicly. 
Sharing public reports and noti-
fications that give a better un-




sure, Attribute disclosure). 
Clear 
GREEN Information shared with 
community or a group of or-
ganizations but not shared 
publicly. 
Sharing cybersecurity infor-
mation within a close commu-
nity. For example, sharing e-







AMBER Share information with a 
specific organization; shar-
ing confined within the or-
ganization to take effective 
action based on it. 
Sharing cybersecurity infor-
mation that contains indicators 
of compromise, course of action 
to a specific community or sec-






RED Information exclusively and 
directly given to Central 
Authority. Sharing outside 
is not legitimate. 
Sharing that you have been at-
tacked or notifying central au-
thority about an incident. 
Attribute-Based Encryption 
(ABE). 
Data Minimization to share 
only relevant data. 
Encrypted 
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2.2 Policy Space  
  We build the policy space of our model as a set of assertions using the context of the 
CTI dataset. The evaluation of cases will be based on the defined assertions. The asser-
tions will contain the legal grounds under which personal data can be processed, in this 
case for the purpose of ensuring network and information security. For instance, asser-
tions for sharing CTI information with other parties are based on both the purpose of 
sharing which is “GDPR Recital 49 - ensuring network and information security” such 
as the prevention of any access to the critical system after credentials leaks, and the 
related legal basis which is “GDPR Art 6.1(c) - processing is necessary for the purposes 
of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party”. These steps 
offer a clear, practical framework, justifying the sharing of cyber threat Intelligence. 
The tagged data which meets the rules based on applicable assertions will be derived 
from the decision graph. In order to build the CTI policy space, we use a JSON file 
maintained by Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg CIRCL [21] for the 
related context of use of data by CSIRTs. The goal of the file is to track processing 
personal information activities and support automation. Many assertions refer to the 
GDPR Art.30 which prescribes all the recordable details of processing activities. The 
main categories of the assertions contain: • Purpose: “The purpose of the processing. Ref GDPR Art. 30(1)(b)” • Legal ground: “Lawfulness/grounds for the processing activity. Ref GDPR Art. 6 
& 5(a).” • Data subjects: “Categories of the data subjects. Reference GDPR Art. 30 (1)(c).” • Personal data: “Personal data processed. Reference GDPR Art. 30 (1)(c).” • Recipients: GDPR Art. 30 (1)(d). • International transfer: “Whether any personal data in this processing activity is 
transferred to a third country or an international organization. Reference GDPR 
Art. 30(1)(e).” • Retention period: “Retention schedule/storage limitation. Reference GDPR Art. 
30(1)(f) and Art. 5(e).” • Security measures: “Security measures & Integrity & Confidentiality. Security 
measures can be technical and/or organizational. Reference GDPR Art. 30(1)(e), 
32(1) and Art. 5(f).” 
Based on the previous assertion list, we need to extract the relevant assertions categories 
specifically related to CTI sharing. We will consider only those assertions that are di-
rectly related to CTI sharing. In the GDPR the purpose of processing personal data 
should be precise and for that the GDPR offers clear recognition of “ensuring network 
and information security” GDPR Recital 49 as the purpose of processing personal data 
for actors such as public authorities and CSIRTs. The legal grounds for processing per-
sonal data are provided in GDPR Art. 6 & 5 (a). CIRCL has published a discussion [22] 
of the legal grounds of information leak analysis and the GDPR context of collection, 
analysis and sharing information leaks. The legal grounds relevant in our context are 
“processing is necessary for the compliance with a legal obligation to which the con-
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troller is subject” where it applies to CSIRTs and data protection authorities and “pro-
cessing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller 
or by a third party” otherwise. In the “legitimate interest” sharing CTI information will 
enable organizations to better detect and prevent attacks by, for example, identifying 
the IP address of a malware communications and control hub. We do not consider “con-
sent” GDPR Art. 6 (1)(a) a credible  legal basis for  processing personal data in the 
context of sharing cyber threat Intelligence. This is because it is very hard to get consent 
of data subjects especially when dealing with huge amounts of data [22] (e.g. 1bn Ya-
hoo accounts were compromised from a 2013 hack [23]) or when personal data such as 
IP addresses concerns the perpetrator of a cyber-attack. Also, the vital interest Art.6 (1) 
(d) is not feasible to be used to justify sharing and processing CTI. The rationale is most 
likely there is no personal data in CTI datasets which would relate to a threat to life. 
However, the public interest Art.6(1)(e) would be the justification to process personal 
data in the case of acting under specific authorization from an official authority to check 
that the cyber incident could affect the public interest.  The description of the personal 
data that pertains directly to the GDPR is described in Art.30 (1) (c). The conditions 
under which personal data can be transferred to third countries or an international or-
ganization are described in GDPR Art. 30(1)(e). As a result, the CTI policy space is 
described in Fig. 1. 
2.3 Decision graph 
In this step, we propose an assessment based on the previous assertions. This assess-
ment contains a set of questions, and the answer to each question will lead to different 
questions or a final decision and as a result, we will assign a specific tag to the CTI 
dataset or even in some cases, the decision would be to not share. This assessment is 
not definitive, but it gives a chance to reflect on our understanding of sharing CTI da-
tasets under the GDPR. Fig 2 shows the decision graph for sharing CTI datasets under 
the GDPR. Some of the decisions in the graph still require human judgement, so we 
make no claims of the process being fully automatable. 
The process first establishes whether the proposed data sharing falls within the scope 
of the GDPR. Then it establishes the legal basis for any special category data included. 
This is likely to be rare in CTI datasets, but we could imagine biometric data following 
an attack that included a physical breach. Next, it establishes the legal basis for the 
overall processing. Then, it checks and selects appropriate retention and security pro-
tections. We assume the “trust level” node’s result has been determined based on pre-
vious knowledge of the trustworthiness of the entity that we are sharing with. The out-
come matches one of the TLP tags as described in the previous section. Of course, the 
CTI datasets are also likely to contain “sensitive” information about the infected asset 
and the exploitable vulnerability that should be protected. The outcome reflects con-
cerns for the data protection angle only; included information that is sensitive in a dif-
ferent dimension might require strengthening of the security measures. 
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Fig. 1. CTI Policy Space 
 
3 Use cases 
Sharing information regarding current or ongoing attacks including information on 
threat actors, attack vectors, victims and impact of the attack is an essential scenario of 
sharing cyber threat Intelligence. In order to see how to apply the tags on CTI datasets 
two different use cases were developed. In the first use case, the organization that is the 
victim informs a central authority about the attack. In the second use case, an organiza-
tion informs another organization about a recent attack that affects the availably, con-
fidentiality or integrity of services. 
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Fig. 2. Decision Graph 
 
Use Case 1: informing central authority 
This case study consists of two organizations, A and C (Central Authority) where an 
organization A wants to report an incident to organization C about a remote access tool 
(RAT) used by different threat actors. Before sharing the information, the reporter 
wants to be sure that sharing it is legitimate under the GDPR.  
The incident report contains personal information such as contact information of the 
reporter and credential information. Therefore, sharing and processing of such personal 
data would need to be legitimate under the GDPR. In order to decide how to share this 
information, the reporter needs to run an evaluation. The organization A is the owner 
of this dataset and has the right to process this information, hence in this scenario the 
organization A is considered the controller. Although the incident information contains 
personal data, it does not contain any special category data, such as, biometrics or po-
litical opinion, religious or philosophical beliefs, etc. In order to share this information 
with a Computer Security Incident Reporting Team CSIRT or the central authority, the 
reporter can rely on GDPR Art. 6(1)(c) where the legal ground states “processing is 
necessary for the compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject”. 
Organization A has a retention policy in place. The security measures that should be 
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applied to reduce the risk of harm to data subjects before sharing this dataset are: en-
crypted storage associated with a secure protocol to transmit this information. Moreo-
ver, the data will be encrypted by using ABE techniques with the properties (National, 
CA, Big) so as a result the final tag for this data will be RED. Fig. 3 shows a sample 
questionnaire covering this case study.  
Fig. 3. Use case 1 Assessment Graph 
 
Use Case 2: Sharing information about port scanning for incident prevention.  
Suppose an organization O1 in the energy sector detects port scanning from a spe-
cific IP address for port range 0-1023 which is considered a potential threat. For inci-
dent prevention purposes, they may want to share information containing the source IP 
address, port range, the time of the incident, signs of the incident, and the course of 
action such as improve monitoring on these ports. 
The personal information in this scenario consists of the reporter information along 
with that of the individual who has made the observations. Organization O1 is the con-
troller of this data and needs to share this information with trusted company O2. Be-
cause the dataset contains personal information, sharing needs to be legitimate under 
the GDPR. The dataset does not contain any special category data so we can continue 
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and check the purpose of this sharing, which is the GDPR Recital 49 – “ensuring net-
work and information security”. The reporter can rely on the GDPR Art. 6(1)(f). The 
legal ground for sharing this information is “processing is necessary for the purposes 
of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party”. Presumably 
there is a retention policy in place. The security measures that will be associated before 
sharing this dataset are: encrypted storage associated with a secure protocol to transmit 
this information, Anonymization against any Identity disclosure and the data will be 
encrypted by using ABE techniques associated with the properties (EU, Energy sector, 
Medium). The trust level based on an assumed external calculation is high so as a result 
the final tag for this data will be AMBER. Fig. 4 shows a sample questionnaire covering 
this case study.  
Fig. 4. Use case 2 Assessment Graph 
 
 
As a result, we present two use cases for sharing CTI datasets between different 
entities. The datasets have been evaluated based on the decision graph built in section 
2. The decision is positive in both use cases, but it associated with different protection 
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levels based on the flow of the assertions. Hence, our approach can give any organiza-
tion intends to share CTI datasets the ability to determine that they are legally compliant 
with the GDPR. 
4 Related Work  
Many papers have addressed issues related to terms and rules extracted from regu-
lations and policies for protecting personal data.   K. Fatema, Chadwick, and  Van Alse-
noy [24] converted the precursor of the GDPR, the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive 
[25] into executable rules to support access control policies. The authors presented a 
system to automate legal access control policy to make automated decision concerning 
authorization rights and obligations based on the related legal requirements. Doorn and 
Thomas [26]developed a specialized tool for privacy control based on the GDPR to 
share sensitive research datasets. The authors defined the security measures of the data 
tags levels based on the DANS EASY repository [27]. The authors focused on datasets 
managed by researchers in a general context. Breaux and Antón [28] [29] worked to 
extract data access rights from a legal test of the US Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA). They used ontology to classify legal rules of privacy re-
quirements from regulations to give a decision to grant or deny the access right. In [30] 
Schweighofer, Kieseberg and Kieseberg, a privacy by design solution to exchanging 
cyber security incident information between CSIRTs is presented. This solution fo-
cused only on sharing information between closed user circles such as the CSIRTs. The 
authors aimed to illustrate the legal requirements about sharing CTI datasets which 
contain personal information between the CSIRTs without giving a systematic way to 
help the CTI datasets manager to check the legality of sharing such information. In our 
work, we aim to build a set of sharing requirements that CTI datasets managers will 
check to provide a decision about sharing CTI dataset(s) under the GDPR.  
5 Conclusion and future work 
 In this work, we have presented an approach that can help different entities to make 
a decision compliant with the GDPR when sharing CTI datasets. We have suggested 
adequate privacy preserving methods that should be applied when sharing CTI datasets. 
Then we have defined the policy space that related to the CTI in the context of the 
GDPR and finally built the decision graph that checks the legal requirements and pro-
vides a decision on how to share this information.  
There are limitations in our approach. In complex use cases, the decisions in the 
assessment graph may still be very demanding, such as whether the Recital 49 objective 
justifies any privacy impacts on the data subject. Furthermore, including additional reg-
ulations or local policies besides the way they will interact with the GDPR requirements 
would make the decision graph more complex. Additional legal and technical require-
ments might make the data tag collection harder to structure and manage, as well as 
complicating the decision process.  
13 
In our previous work [2], we have identified the associated threats of disclosing CTI. 
Here we have specifically addressed the legal risks associated with sharing CTI da-
tasets. Our overall work aims to mitigate all threats associated with sharing CTI datasets 
and improve the sharing process. As future work, we will extend the current model to 
evaluate the trust level and the associated risks in more detail. In addition, we intend to 
study the tradeoff between the privacy preservation and utility of processing CTI da-
tasets. 
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